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I. Introduction
Risk and uncertainty influence many channel
decisions, especially those in turbulent channels
with uncertain pay-offs. Managing or reducing
such risk involves managing the vulnerability
and volatility of cash flows to help create share-
holder value (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
1998). Such an effort requires the integration of
finance and marketing (Rappaport 1986). A key
question is how risk reduction behaviors are in-
fluenced by risk perceptions, risk attitudes, and
the market structure across the buying side and
the selling side of the channel. Understanding
and anticipating the resulting changes is espe-
cially important in commodity and in technol-
ogy industries where risk continually fluctuates
(Anderson 1982). It is also critical in industries
where unpredicted events—such as product
recalls or food safety concerns—dramatically
influence channel supply and demand of prod-
ucts with prescribed characteristics (Pennings,
Wansink, and Meulenberg 2002).
Research on risk management in channel situa-
tions often assumes risk aversion and focuses on
either risk perceptions or on risk attitudes. Sel-
dom, however, have these two constructs—risk
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By integrating elements
of both marketing and
finance, we show how
risk influences channel
contract behavior. We
model risk behavior as
the interaction between
risk attitude and risk
perception (IRAP). An
analysis of the joint
channel decisions of 208
producers, wholesalers,
and processors provides
three results. First, risk
attitudes significantly
vary across different
levels of channel mem-
bers. Second, IRAP – in
combination with the
channel member’s
market structure on the
buying and selling side –
is a strong predictor of
contract behavior.
Third, increases in
channel power
strengthen the impact of
IRAP on channel con-
tract behavior.
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perceptions and risk attitudes—been investigated simultaneously. Yet,
channel members are not homogeneous and differences in risk atti-
tudes and their risk perceptions may vary quite dramatically up and
down the channel. These differences in risk attitudes and risk perceptions
may be played out in different channel contract strategies. In addition,
channel contract behavior may be also influenced by the market structure
in which channel members operate and by their relative channel power.
Consistent with the notable work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971),
we investigate how the interaction between risk attitude and risk per-
ception (IRAP) influences channel members’ contract decisions. Un-
derstanding this interaction provides us with a tool to better understand
how risk management behaviors (such as using fixed-price contracts)
vary across different market structures and different levels of channel
power. This is tested by examining the probability with which a chan-
nel member (such as a producer, wholesaler, or processor) employs
various channel contract strategies to manage their risks. In this paper,
we specifically examine the use of three common strategies: 1) estab-
lishing spot contract relationships on both the buying and selling side,
2) establishing fixed-price contract relationships on both the buying
and selling side, and 3) establishing asymmetric contract relationships.
Asymmetric contract relationships are characterized by the use of spot
contracts on the buying side and fixed-price contract contracts on the
selling side, or vice versa.
This paper begins with an overview of how risk attitudes and risk
perceptions, combined with channel market structure, influence the
behavior of channel members. Following this, hypotheses are derived
that relate the interaction of risk attitudes and risk perceptions to con-
tracting behavior.
The empirical findings, based on personal computer-guided inter-
views with 208 channel members, show that risk attitudes and risk
perceptions differ widely across the three channel levels. Furthermore,
the interaction between risk attitude and risk perception (IRAP), in
combination with the channel member’s market structure, is shown to
be a useful predictor of a channel member’s contract behavior. This
influence of IRAP on channel contract decision behavior is strength-
ened as channel power increases.
II. The Interaction between Risk Attitude and Risk Perception
Risk may be perceived differently across channel members, and how
channel members cope with perceived risk will depend on their risk
attitude. Before a channel member can respond to risk, risk must first be
perceived or identified (Trimpop 1994). Stone, Yates, and Parker (1994)
modeled the identification of risks as a cognitive process of identifi-
cation, storage, and retrieval. While a market might be considered
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turbulent by economic standards, the level of risk it presents to a
channel member depends on his or her risk perception. A channel
member who believes that he or she can predict the market price will
perceive the market as less risky than a channel member who believes
he or she is unable to predict the market price.
Risk perception reflects the channel member’s interpretation of the
likelihood of exposure to the content of the risk (e.g., price fluctua-
tions) and is defined as a channel member’s assessment of the risk in-
herent in a particular situation. On the other hand, risk attitude reflects
the channel member’s general or consistent predisposition toward risk.
It is important to emphasize that risk attitude and risk perceptions are
two different concepts. Whereas risk attitude deals with the decision-
maker’s interpretation of the content of the risk, and how much he or
she dislikes risk, risk perception deals with the decision-maker’s in-
terpretation of the likelihood of being exposed to the content of a par-
ticular risk.
We do not expect risk attitude and risk perception to individually
have a direct impact on the contract strategies employed by channel
members. Instead, as shown in Figure 1, we believe it is the combination
of risk attitude and risk perception that influences behavior. After all,
regardless of one’s individual risk attitudes a channel member will not
change his or her behavior if no risk is perceived in a given situation.
When risk-averse channel members perceive risk, they will exhibit
risk management behavior (i.e., behavior to decrease their risk expo-
sure). Risk-seeking channel members, on the other hand, will exhibit
risky behavior when they perceive risk, or they may even seek out ways
to increase their risk (because of the corresponding expected pay-off ).
The interaction between risk attitude and risk perception (IRAP) rep-
resents how the channel member intends to cope with risks in the
Fig. 1.—How the interaction between risk attitude and risk perception influ-
ences behavior.
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channel, along with the risks his or her own actions generate. As such,
the concept is related to risk behavior intention.1
This basic hypothesis that the interaction between risk attitudes and
risk perceptions is related to behavior is consistent with the notable
research that Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) conducted on the analysis
of risk management behavior (See Appendix A). Both risk attitude and
risk perception are continuous variables. Risk attitudes range from
extremely risk-averse (i.e., refusing any risk under any condition) to
extremely risk-seeking (i.e., always preferring a risk-carrying outcome).
Risk perceptions, on the other hand, range from perceiving no risk to
perceiving high risk.
In this study, we define IRAP as positive when channel members
perceive risk and are risk averse. We define it as negative when
channel members perceive risk and are risk seeking. We define it as
zero when channel members either do not perceive any risk or when
they are risk neutral (see Figure 1). A channel member’s IRAP profile
should reveal how he or she is going to react to future situations. It
should also reflect channel members’ predispositions to dealing with
the risks inherent to the stimuli they receive and the risks their actions
generate.
III. Channel Member’s Contract Behavior on Both the Selling
and Buying Side
While there are many motivations to manage risk, a notable one
involves the creation of shareholder value. Srivastava, Shervani, and
Fahey (1998, 1999) argue that lower volatility and vulnerability re-
duce the risk associated with cash flows. This may result in a lower
cost of capital and a lower discount rate, thereby potentially contrib-
uting to the creation of shareholder value. A channel member’s ob-
jective is to reduce profit volatility, which does not necessarily mean
reducing price volatility, because profit is a composite of all cash flow
streams (prices of inputs and outputs). That is, the channel member is
interested in the risk that remains after parts of the cash flow risks
from buying and selling products and services have been cancelled
out. (Anderson and Danthine 1980, 1981; Zilcha and Broll 1992). This
remaining risk, which equals profit risk, is often referred to as residual
risk. Hence, risk management behavior must take an integrative per-
spective, and must include both the buying and selling markets of
1. An analogue can be made with the multi-attribute attitude theory introduced by
Fishbein and Azjen (1975). In this theory, the attitude towards an object (e.g., a risk man-
agement strategy) leads to the intention to choose that object, and, ultimately, to choice.
IRAP is on the intention level (as opposed to the attitude level) and reflects a latent behavior
to deal with risk.
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channel members. Each market may generate different levels of risk,
due to structural differences.
Channel members can manage their risk by buying from several
suppliers and by using a risk-reducing channel-contract strategy with-
in the channel. In this paper, we elaborate on how channel members
use contracts on both the buying and selling side to reduce profit risk. By
doing so, they reduce the fluctuations in their net cash flow stream.
The research framework shown in Figure 2 consists of the buying
and selling side of four types of channel members: 1) the producer,
2) the wholesaler, 3) the processor, and 4) the retailer. The solid arrows
represent the cash flow streams between channel members generated
by channel contracts (e.g., spot transactions versus fixed-price con-
tracts). The dashed arrows represent cash flow streams that are gen-
erated by the channel member’s cost structure (variable versus fixed
costs) and reflect the channel member’s production process. The re-
lationship between the cash flows on the buying and selling side is
influenced by the market structures in which channel members operate
and the production processes employed. In this paper we focus on how
the channel member’s IRAP profile and the channel member’s market
structures on the buying and selling side drive channel contract behavior.
A. Spot Contracts versus Fixed-price Contracts
Different channel contract strategies carry different levels of risk (e.g.,
Lusch and Brown 1996). A channel member can influence the level of
price risk exposure by carefully selecting his or her channel contract
strategy when selling and when buying. In this paper, we focus on two
broad classes of price-related channel contracts: 1) spot contracts (also
Fig. 2.—Research framework
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referred to as spot transactions), and 2) fixed-price contracts. Spot
contracts define the price at the moment of the transaction (at time t +1),
based on the spot market. Cash flows resulting from such contracts are
uncertain at time t. Fixed-price contracts, on the other hand, fix the
price at the moment that the contract is initiated (at time t). Hence, the
cash flow generated at the time of actual delivery (time t +1) is certain.
Thus, a fixed-price contract reduces the volatility of cash flows between
channel members (e.g., Crocker and Masten 1991).2 The role of fixed-
price contracts in industrial marketing channels is significant, as many
channel relations are characterized by a chain of fixed-price contracts
between two or more channel members.
B. Channel Members’ Market Structures on the Buying and Selling
Side: Cash Flow Relationships
It has been argued that the motivation for risk reduction is not to
reduce the price risk of a single asset or commodity but to reduce the
residual risk of all aggregate contracts (Anderson and Danthine 1980;
Rolfo 1980; Anderson and Danthine 1981; Zilcha and Broll 1992; and
Pennings and Leuthold 2001). Channel members are interested in the
profit resulting from all contract relationships, not just a single con-
tract relationship. The profit is the result of the channel member’s
entire production process; all the goods and services he or she pur-
chases and sells. The volatility of this profit is determined by the cash
flow relationships between inputs and outputs, and this volatility in-
creases when there is a negative correlation between the cash flow
of inputs and outputs. In such a case, the volatility in the cash flow
streams is increased because the combined profit volatility is higher
than the cash flow volatility of the separate inputs or outputs. In
contrast, when there is a positive correlation between the cash flow of
inputs and outputs, profit volatility decreases, because the cash flow
fluctuations (partly) neutralize each other. This is a situation often
referred to as a natural hedge (Pennings and Leuthold 2001).3
The correlation (r) between the cash flow streams reflects the
channel member’s cash flow relationships and is an important factor
when understanding channel behavior.4 The correlation between the
cash flows is determined by the market structures on the buying
and selling side. Besides being influenced by competition (pure
competition vs. oligopoly), the correlation between the cash flows is
2. In the work of Lusch and Brown (1996), fixed-price contracts can be described as
explicit, hard and discrete contracts (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).
3. A natural hedge expresses a condition in which an exposure to a risk factor is offset or
partly offset by an opposite exposure to that risk factor.
4. Cash flow relationships are not only important when understanding firm’s channel
contract behavior but also to understand the value of the firm (Brick, Frierman and Kim 1998).
702 Journal of Business
#04409 UCP: BN article # 770415
influenced by the firm’s cost-structure (ratio between variable and
fixed costs), which is closely related to the production system em-
ployed by the channel member. Figures 2 visualizes how the market
structure influences the cash flows (i.e., the solid arrows) and how the
production process (i.e., the firm’s cost structure) influences the cash
flows (i.e., the dashed arrows). Variations in the correlation (r) be-
tween the cash flow streams for the same category of channel members
are attributed to variations across dissimilar production systems. Chan-
nel members with similar production systems, such as wholesalers of
commodities (whose ‘‘production system’’ is rather simple, as it en-
tails trading the commodity), will show a relatively low variation in
the correlation (r) between the cash flow streams, whereas channel
members with heterogeneous production systems show a relatively
higher variation in (r).
C. Channel Members’ Market Structures & Channel Members’
IRAP Profiles
A channel member’s market structure profile is reflected by the rela-
tionships between the cash flows generated on the selling and the
buying side. It is the interaction between a channel member’s market
structure profile and his or her IRAP profile that ultimately determines
the final contract behavior (i.e., whether spot contracts or fixed-price
contracts are used to manage risk).5 While a channel member’s market
structure profile reflects the net cash flow volatility, the IRAP profile
reflects the channel member’s propensity towards this net cash flow
(profit) volatility. Hence, the IRAP profile and the correlation (r)
between the cash flows on the buying and selling side play a crucial
role in understanding channel contract behavior. Let us consider each
individually:
1. The channel member’s IRAP profile. When IRAP> 0, the channel
member perceives risk, while being risk averse. We expect this
channel member to be inclined to decrease his or her profit volatility.
When IRAP< 0, the channel member perceives risk, while being
risk seeking. We expect this channel member to be inclined to in-
crease his or her profit volatility.
2. The correlation r between the cash flows from the buying and
selling side. When r< 0, there is reinforcement of the cash flow
volatilities from the buying and selling side. When r> 0, the cash
flow volatilities from the buying and selling side are (partly) neu-
tralized, resulting in a natural hedge.
5. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out the important role of the
channel member’s market structure to understand channel contract behavior.
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In this paper, a channel member is assumed to decide on contract
relationships for purchases and sales simultaneously, based on the
economic principle of the coordination of channel contract relation-
ships on the buying and selling side in order to maximize profit,
discounted by risk (i.e., maximizing shareholder value). Table 1 illus-
trates three channel contract strategies: 1) establishing spot contract
relationships on both the buying and selling side, 2) establishing fixed-
price contract relationships on both the buying and selling side, and 3)
establishing asymmetric contract relationships. The latter contract strat-
egy includes spot contracting relationships on the buying side and
fixed-price contract relationships on the selling side or vice versa. In
the empirical part of this study, we classify channel members’ contract
strategies along the dimensions of their IRAP and market structure.
Table 1 shows how the different combinations of these key vari-
ables are hypothesized to influence channel contract relationship be-
havior. It shows that spot contracting occurs on the buying and selling
side, when there is a positive correlation between the cash flows on the
buying and selling side and when the manager has a positive IRAP.
The reason for this is that a spot contract strategy decreases risk ex-
posure by using the ‘‘natural-hedge’’ effect (whereby cash flow fluc-
tuations on the selling side (partly) neutralize the cash flow volatility
on the buying side). Under these conditions, the use of fixed-price
contracting on both the buying and selling side would also reduce
risk exposure. Yet, whether a channel member uses spot contracts or
fixed-price contracts in this situation depends on the size of the natural
TABLE 1 Hypothesized Contract Relationships Across Various Market
Structures and Channel Members’ IRAP Profiles
Channel Manager’s IRAP Profile
Channel Member’s
Market Structure
(Correlation
between input
and output cash
flows—r)
IRAP > 0
(The motivation is to
decrease the volatility
in the net cash flow
stream)
IRAP < 0
(The motivation is to
increase the volatility
in the net cash flow
stream)
r > 0
(Natural hedge
situation)
Buying side! Spot
contracts
Selling side ! Spot
contracts
Buying side! Fixed-price
contracts
Selling side! Spot
contracts
or
Buying side! Spot
contracts
Selling side! Fixed-price
contracts
r < 0
(No natural hedge)
Buying side! Fixed-price
contracts
Selling side! Fixed-price
contracts
Buying side! Spot
contracts
Selling side! Spot
contracts
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hedge. If the natural hedge is large enough to reduce the net cash flow
volatility sufficiently, the channel member will prefer to use the less
complex natural hedge. In case of a negative IRAP, the channel member
is motivated to increase or even maximize the volatility of the net cash
flow stream. This can be accomplished by using asymmetric contract
relationships on the buying and selling side.
Table 1 also addresses the situation when r < 0; that is, when the
cash flow volatility of the buying side and selling side reinforce each
other ( leading to increased profit volatility). In this situation, a manager
with a positive IRAP will hypothetically use fixed-price contracts on
the buying and selling side. In general, we hypothesize the following:
H1: The interaction between a channel member’s IRAP profile and
market structure is related to the probability of using a particular
channel contract strategy.
Based on Table 1, we can refine H1 as follows:
H2A: If a channel member’s IRAP is positive and natural hedge
market structures exist (r>0), spot contracts on both the selling
and buying side will be the dominant channel contract strategy
(upper left cell of Table 1).
H2B: If a channel member’s IRAP is negative and natural hedge
market structures exist (r> 0), asymmetric channel contract rela-
tionships will be the dominant channel contract strategy (upper
right cell of Table 1).
and
H3A: If a channel member’s IRAP is positive and no natural hedge
market structures exist (r<0), fixed-price contracts on both the
selling and buying side will be the dominant channel contract
strategy ( lower left cell of Table 1).
H3B: If a channel member’s IRAP is negative and no natural hedge
market structures exist (r< 0), spot contracts on both the selling
and buying side will be the dominant channel contract strategy
( lower right cell of Table 1).
D. Channel Power
The type of trading strategy used by channel members may also de-
pend on their channel power. Consistent with El-Ansary and Stern
(1972) and Frazier (1983), power is defined as the ability of one
channel member to influence another’s marketing strategy. In the
context of this study, power can be used to influence the price term in
a contract on two dimensions—the price level and the price variability
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(Gaski and Nevin 1985; Kale 1986; Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz
1987; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; and Buchanan 1992). In this study,
power refers to a channel member’s ability to influence the price dis-
covery process in the channel. If a channel member can influence the
price formation process, he or she is said to have power.6
Channel members who exert power over the price formation process
can do so on two dimensions. First, they can influence prices, by trying
to realize the highest ( lowest) price level possible when selling (pur-
chasing). Second, risk-averse channel members with a market structure
of r< 0 who perceive risk (i.e., with positive IRAP) can try to reduce
net cash flow variability by shifting the price risk to other channel
members by using fixed-price contracts. In contrast, channel members
with a negative IRAP will instead use risk-shifting power to accumu-
late risk in this situation. Hence, we expect the influence of IRAP on
channel contract strategy to increase as channel power increases:
H4: The more (less) power the channel member has, the larger
(smaller) the effect of IRAP on the probability of using a par-
ticular channel contracting strategy.
IV. Research Method
A. Empirical Domain
To test the proposed hypotheses effectively, we needed a channel con-
text with minimal channel coordination, minimal channel integration,
and multiple channel members at multiple channel levels. Also we
needed a competitive environment with a wide range of heterogeneity
among the channel members. The Dutch pork industry was found to
meet all these requirements. It consists of three types of channel
members: producers (hog farms, where piglets are raised to slaughter-
ready hogs), wholesalers (wholesalers of live hogs), and processors
(slaughterhouses, which are usually also meat packers), who sell their
meat products to the retailers.
Producers face an oligopolistic market structure on the buying side
(there are relatively few suppliers of mixed feed) and a competitive
market structure on the selling side (there are relatively many whole-
salers). Wholesalers face a competitive market on the buying side and a
oligopolistic market structure on the selling side (there are relatively few
processors). Processors also face a competitive market on the buying
side (there are relative many wholesalers), and an oligopolistic market
6. The channel member’s power to influence the price term of a contract may come from
the fact that the channel member is able to manipulate other contract terms, such as place or
time of delivery, and quality (e.g., Betancourt and Gautschi 1998).
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structure on the selling side (there are only five large retail organizations
that buy meat products from processors in the Netherlands).
The producers are heterogeneous as to their production methods, and
they use either an ‘‘open production system’’ (OPS) or a ‘‘closed pro-
duction system’’ (CPS). In the OPS, both piglets and feed is purchased,
and piglets are then raised to slaughter hogs in three months. The CPS
is similar to the OPS, except that in CPS the producer breeds the pig-
lets instead of buying them. The ‘‘production’’ process of wholesalers is
rather simple and homogeneous: they trade the hogs and serve as in-
termediaries between producers and processors. Processors have rather
homogeneous production processes, although innovations in slaugh-
tering techniques may cause some small differences in labor produc-
tivity (computer-guided cutting equipment versus manual labor). Since
we study behavior on the level of the individual channel member,
we can test the relationship between market structure and members’
channel contracting behaviors empirically.
B. Sample and Data Collection Procedure
The Dutch pork industry consists of 20,000 hog farmers, 150 hog
wholesalers and 65 slaughterhouses. A sample was randomly drawn
from directories kept by the Dutch Agricultural Association for hog
farms, the Dutch Union of Livestock Wholesalers, and the Dutch Pork
Association, for the processors. Before sending a written request to
participate in the computer-guided interview, preliminary phone calls
were made to assure up-to-date contact information and to obtain pre-
commitment for completing the study (Sudman and Wansink 2002).
Response rates were 80% among producers (n ¼ 128), 60% among
wholesalers (n ¼ 50), and 60% among processors (n ¼ 30). The per-
sonal computer-guided interview was developed and 30 test inter-
views were conducted to ensure that the questions were interpreted
correctly. All interviewers had prior experience and were trained in
the assessment procedures. The interviews took place at the channel
member’s enterprise and were conducted during the first half of 1998.
The interviews lasted about 35 minutes, during which the channel
members worked through several assignments and questions.
C. Measures
1. Spot Contracts versus Fixed-price Contracts
It was coded whether channel members used fixed-price contracts or
spot transactions with their main contract parties, for both the selling
and the buying side.7 Fixed-price contracts, in this context, refer to
7. In the Dutch hog industry, managers usually purchase or sell all their products through
either fixed-price contracts or the spot market. Mixed strategies are scarce.
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agreements in which prices are determined before delivery or recep-
tion of the commodity. Spot contracts refer to sales or purchases in the
spot market, where transaction and price determination take place at
the same moment.
2. Channel Members’ Market Structures
Channel members were asked to indicate whether the cash flow
streams of the buying and selling side generated by their main contract
party were moving together (e.g., positive correlation), had no relation
(e.g., correlation of zero), or were moving in opposite directions (e.g.,
negative correlation). We divided the market structure into two clas-
ses: 1) a structure with a natural hedge present (e.g. positive correla-
tion) and 2) a structure without a natural hedge (e.g., no correlation or
negative correlation).
3. Channel Power
Following the work of Butaney and Wortzel (1988), we focused on the
perceived market power of the channel members in determining the
allocation of power between the channel members. Brown, Johnson,
and Koening (1995) found that the direct approach of measuring
channel power resulted in measurements with good construct validity.
Therefore, the power perceived by a channel member was measured
by asking him or her to indicate the perceived extent to which he or
she has power over the price discovery process (relative to the other
channel member). To obtain an accurate measurement, each respon-
dent was asked to distribute 100 points among his or her own enter-
prise and the other channel member, where more points indicated
more power.
V. Assessing Risk Attitude, Risk Perception, and IRAP
The IRAP cannot be measured directly because of its composite
structure (i.e., the combination of risk perception and risk attitude). In
the context of our study, risk perception refers to the risk that man-
agers perceive with respect to their profits (net cash flow stream). Risk
attitude is a domain-specific concept (MacCrimmon and Wehrung
1986; March and Shapira 1992). Since our domain constitutes both
purchasing and sales transactions, we elicited risk attitude in the do-
main of financial (market) risk. While the two concepts, risk attitude
and risk perception can easily be discerned in a theoretical perspective,
operationalization of the two concepts is a challenge. Following
Pennings and Smidts (2000), we used a revealed behavior method to
elicit risk attitude. In this method the channel member’s utility func-
tion is elicited and the curvature of the utility function is used as a
measure for risk attitude. This elicitation procedure is conceptually
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consistent with the Pratt and Arrow framework outlined in Section II,
yet it uses a scaling procedure to measure risk perception.8 We will
now first describe the risk perception and risk attitude measures, fol-
lowed by the IRAP measure.
A. Risk Perception
We measured risk perception through a scale that we developed ac-
cording to the iterative procedure recommended by Churchill (1979).
First, based on the literature, we generated a large pool of items, taking
care to tap the domain of the risk perception construct as closely as
possible. Next, we tested the items for clarity and appropriateness in
personally administered pretests with 30 channel managers. The re-
spondents were asked to complete a questionnaire, to provide general
feedback, and to indicate any ambiguities or other difficulties in re-
sponding to the items. Based on their feedback, we eliminated some
items, modified others, and developed additional items. The resulting
scale measures the extent to which channel members perceive their own
financial performance (which is reflected in their net cash flow stream)
as risky. The composite reliability (a) is 0.82, indicating a reliable
construct measurement (e.g., Hair et al. 1998). (See Appendix B for a
detailed description of the scale).
B. Risk Attitude
In this study, we have used the recent findings of Pennings and Smidts
(2000) and Pennings and Garcia (2001) to measure risk attitude, as
related to the expected utility model (von Neumann and Morgenstern
1947). In the expected utility model, the curvature of the utility func-
tion u(x) reflects risk attitude (Keeney and Raiffa 1998). Fundamen-
tal to this approach is that the utility function, and hence, risk attitude,
is assessed through the certainty equivalence method by means of
lotteries.9
8. Some researchers have measured risk perception by assessing the probability function
of respondents, using the interval technique (see for an application Smidts (1997), and for a
detailed description of these techniques Farquhar (1984), and Hershey and Schoemaker
(1985)). A drawback of this measurement is that it requires a great deal of effort and time
from the respondents, and it is extremely costly when conducted on a large scale.
9. In the certainty equivalence method (cf. Keeney and Raiffa 1998), the respondent
compares the lottery (xl,p;xh) with a certain outcome, where (xl, p;xh) is the two-outcome
lottery that assigns probability p to outcome xl and probability 1–p to outcome xh, with
xl < xh. The certain outcome is varied until the respondent reveals indifference (this certain
outcome is denoted by CE(p)). By application of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(x)
we obtain: u(CE(p)) = pu(xl) þ (1–p)u(xh). When eliciting utilities, two outcomes are
fixed first, such that the range of outcomes between them includes all outcomes of interest.
Second, one may set u(xL) = 0 and u(xH ) = 1 where xL and xH denote the upper and lower
bound respectively of the outcome range. The certainty equivalence method used in this
study concerns a bisection framework by only using probability 0.5. First, the certainty
equivalent CE(0.5) with utility 0.5 is found as above. Then the outcome CE(0.25) is
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Several authors have provided conditions and useful generalizations
to minimize response bias, often caused by experiments that do not
match the real decision situations of the subjects under consideration
(Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker 1982; Tversky, Sattath, and
Slovic 1988; and Pennings and Smidts 2000).10 Following Pennings
and Smidts (2000), we constructed choice sets that closely match
the choices that these channel members make on a daily basis. The
dimensions of the ‘‘lottery’’ constitute an important design issue. Spe-
cifically, what probability and outcome levels should be used to elicit
risk preferences? Consistent with the financial literature perspective that
prices follow a random walk path (prices can go up or down with equal
probability), we used a probability of 0.5 to express this random walk
(Working 1934; Kendall 1953; and Cargill and Rausser 1975). Since
Dutch hog prices have fluctuated between 2.34 and 4.29 Dutch Guilders
during the period 1990–1998, this range is used in our experimental
design. The certainty equivalence technique was computerized. Chan-
nel members could select between a lottery, a fixed price, or they could
state their indifference. Alternative A consisted of a 50/50 lottery. Al-
ternative B consisted of a fixed price, whereby the initial fixed price was
randomly generated by the computer within the initial upper and lower
bounds. Alternative C consisted of the statement that they were indif-
ferent to alternative A or B. For each lottery, the channel member was
asked to assess the fixed price (i.e. the certainty equivalent) by choosing
between A or B, until the channel member chose C, after which a new
lottery would start. As such, the assessment of the certainty equivalent
was an iterative process.
The measurement procedure took approximately 20 minutes. Nine
points of the utility curve were assessed. Based on the assessed utility
curve, the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion was de-
rived as a measure of risk attitude. The widely-used negative expo-
nential function was fit to each subject’s outcomes (Tsiang 1972).11
obtained with utility 0.25 through an indifference CE(0.25)  (xL, 0.5; CE(0.5)). The in-
difference CE(0.75)(CE(0.5), 0.5; xH) yields certainty equivalence CE(0.75), with utility
0.75, etc. Former responses to lotteries are used in the assessment of subsequent responses. A
large number of CEs can be found after a sufficient number of questions, in which each
question involves a bisection of a particular interval.
10. In the economics literature, Binswanger (1982) argued that biases in the elicitation
procedure may come from, negative preferences toward gambling, absence of realism in
the game setting, and compounding of errors in the elicitation process. Binswanger (1982)
stresses the importance of choice set construction when obtaining the decision-maker’s
utility function. We designed the elicitation procedure such that the choice sets corresponded
to the channel members’ daily decisions.
11. Tsiang (1972) refers to Arrow (1971), who provides four conditions for an acceptable
utility function: 1) the marginal utility of wealth is positive, 2) the marginal utility of wealth
decreases with increasing wealth, 3) absolute risk aversion is constant or decreasing with
increasing wealth, and 4) proportional risk aversion is constant or increasing with increasing
wealth. The negative exponential function meets all four conditions.
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After scaling the boundaries of this function, estimation of just one
parameter is sufficient to characterize a respondent’s risk attitude.12
After having measured the risk attitude and the risk perception for
each channel member, we were able to compose each channel mem-
ber’s IRAP. The IRAP of channel member i is calculated by:
IRAPi ¼ RAi RPi ð1Þ
where RA is the channel member’s risk attitude (positive if the channel
member is risk averse, zero if risk neutral, and negative if risk seek-
ing), and RP the channel member’s risk perception. Because risk at-
titude and risk perception were measured on two different scales, we
standardized the risk attitude and risk perception of each channel mem-
ber prior to calculating the IRAP (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).
VI. Analysis and Results
A. Measurement Results of Risk Attitude and Risk Perception
The parameters presented in Table 2 display the curvature of the
channel member’s utility curve obtained through the certainty equiv-
alence task and reflect the channel member’s preference for risk. For
the producers, wholesalers, and processors, the mean squared errors
(MSE) of their utility curves were 0.028, 0.032, and 0.012, respec-
tively, and their mean R-square values were 0.87, 0.87, and 0.91. This
indicates a good fit with channel members’ responses to the certainty
equivalence tasks. Risk attitude varied widely among producers, in-
dicating that it is not valid to assume risk aversion or risk neutrality
across all producers. The same pattern was found for the wholesalers
and processors. The mean risk attitude parameter (mean a = 0.462)
implies that the average producer exhibits risk-seeking behavior.13 In
contrast to the producers, we find that, on average, the wholesalers and
processors are risk averse (with means of b = 0.118 and c = 0.316,
respectively).14
12. See Smidts (1997) for a detailed procedure regarding the estimation of the risk pa-
rameters using the negative exponential function.
13. These results are in line with previous results from Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse
(1982), who found that CEOs from small firms were more inclined towards risk taking.
Several explanations of risk-taking behavior have been advanced depending on the specific
domain. For example, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) found that responding to market devel-
opments entails some degree of risk taking. Han, Kim, and Srivastava (1998) found that
greater market orientation leads to higher degrees of risky, innovative behavior.
14. The hypothesis that the means of the risk attitude measures of manufactures, whole-
salers and processors are equal was rejected at the 5% level, using an ANOVA analysis,
thereby further substantiating that different channel members have different levels of risk
attitude.
711Channel Contract Behavior
#04409 UCP: BN article # 770415
Two consistency checks were built into the elicitation procedure to
assess whether the channel members were consistent in their choices.
Two measurements at u(x) = 0.5 and two measurements at u(x) =
0.625 were obtained in order to test the internal consistency of the
assessments. If channel members responded in accordance with
expected utility theory, similar certainty equivalents should result.
As expected, the assessed certainty equivalents for the same utility
levels were similar (pairwise test = p> 0.99) for both consistency
measurements.
These findings support the notion that the channel members were
consistent in their choices. The findings further substantiate that the
research design closely resembles the real business context of the
channel members, thereby minimizing response mode effects (Payne
1997; Shapira 1997).
The parameter estimates from Table 2 are illustrated in Figure 3,
which shows the average utility curves for producers, wholesalers, and
processors. In this figure, a convex curve (a negative parameter in the
negative exponential function) indicates risk-seeking behavior, whereas
a concave curve (a positive parameter in the negative exponential
function) indicates risk-averse behavior.
The risk perception scores were 8.0 for producers, 7.8 for whole-
salers, and 6.9 for processors. This suggests that the channel members
agree that the markets in which they sell are risky (see Table 3).
Implicitly, these empirical findings show that risk attitudes and risk
perceptions differ across different levels in the channel. Furthermore
our data indicate that channel members’ risk perceptions and risk
TABLE 2 Risk Attitude Estimates for each Channel Member
Producers Wholesalers Processors
a b c
Parameter
Mean 0.462 0.118 0.316
Median 0.217 0.093 0.289
st.dev. 1.232 0.669 0.796
Fit indices
a
Mean MSE 0.028 0.032 0.012
Mean R2 0.872 0.874 0.913
Classification of respondents
b
on the basis of the t-value
c
Risk Averse 39% 63% 78%
Risk Neutral 4% 3% 4%
Risk Seeking 57% 34% 18%
a MSE = Mean Squared Error; R2 is calculated by squaring the Pearson correlation between actual
values and the values predicted from the model.
b If a, b or c > 0, the respondent is said to be risk averse and if a, b or c < 0, risk seeking.
c A respondent is classified as risk neutral when the parameter is not significantly different from zero
at the p = 0.05 level.
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attitudes are not significantly correlated (r = 0.16, p = 0.12), con-
firming the conceptual notion that risk attitude and risk perception are
different concepts.
B. Descriptive Findings: Actual Channel Member Behavior
In line with previous findings (Pennings and Smidts 2000), Table 4
shows that the majority of processors are risk averse and perceive risk
(IRAP > 0). This is in contrast to the producers, who are willing
to take risks (53.9% of the producers show a negative IRAP).
The market structure differs for the three types of channel members.
Wholesalers are operating in a market structure dominated by a natural
hedge situation. This might be explained by the fact that wholesalers
Fig. 3.—The average utility function for producers, wholesalers and processors
TABLE 3 Results of Risk Perception Scale
1
Producers Wholesalers Processors
Mean 8.05 7.77 6.89
Median 5.00 7.00 6.00
Standard Deviation 1.67 2.13 2.23
1 The average sum score of the risk perception scale is presented (some items were re-coded, so that
a relatively high score indicates the perception of relatively high levels of risk). See appendix B for a
detailed description of the scale.
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only move the product through the chain, without minimal modifi-
cation. Producers and processors face both natural and non-natural
hedge situations. Market channel members at the same level in the
channel (producers, wholesalers or processors) show greater homo-
geneity in the correlation between input and output cash flows (r) than
across the three channel categories. The extent of homogeneity of r
within a channel category varies with the variation in cost structures
(reflected in the production systems employed) of these channel mem-
bers. The homogeneity in the correlation between input and output cash
flows (r) for wholesalers is explained by the fact that they face a similar
market structure and have similar cost structures. Producers and pro-
cessors show less homogeneity in r because of more dissimilarities in
the cost structures.
The majority of producers perceive their channel power as low,
whereas a majority of the processors believe that they have power in
the marketing channel.
The differences in market structures and IRAP profiles among
the three types of channel members are played out in different chan-
nel contract relationship strategies. Interestingly, all types of channel
contract strategies are employed by the three types of channel mem-
bers, showing that the heterogeneity in channel contract relationship
strategies is not solely driven by the type of channel member, but also
by risk behavior (IRAP profile) and environment (market structure).
C. Procedure for Testing the Hypotheses
To test the hypotheses reflected in Table 1, we classified the re-
spondents according to their channel contract strategy, IRAP, market
TABLE 4 Characteristics of Sample & Channel Members’ Contract Relationships
Producers
(n =128)
Wholesalers
(n =50)
Processors
(n =30)
IRAP
H IRAP > 0 (n =103) 46.1% 50.0% 63.3%
H IRAP < 0 (n = 105) 53.9% 50.0% 36.7%
Market Structure
H Natural hedge situation 42.2% 80.0% 53.3%
H No natural hedge situation 57.8% 20.0% 46.7%
Channel Power (self-perceived )
H Low channel power 51.6% 52.0% 36.7%
H High channel power 48.4% 48.0% 63.3%
Channel Contract Relationship
H Spot contracting on both
buying and selling side
28.9% 24.0% 16.7%
H Fixed-price contract
relationships on both the
buying and selling side
39.1% 34.0% 50.0%
H Asymmetric contract relationships 32.0% 42.0% 33.3%
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structure, and channel power. Respondents were classified as having
relatively low power, if they had allocated less than 50 points to
themselves (and hence more than 50 points to their trading partner),
and as having relatively high power, if they had allocated more than
50 points to themselves. Table 5 shows the observed frequencies of
channel members using spot contracting on both the buying and selling
side, fixed-price contracting on both the buying and selling side, or
asymmetric contract relationships. This study was designed so that the
hypotheses, as reflected in Table 1, could be related to the empirical
results in Table 5. The market structure of the majority of the channel
members was characterized by the presence of a natural hedge; that is,
there was a positive correlation between the cash flow streams gener-
ated by selling and buying activities. This phenomenon occurs often
in commodity channels in which products are ‘‘moved’’ through the
channel with little modification. Indeed, we have found that natural
hedges are more common among wholesalers than for producers and
processors.
D. IRAP, Market Structure and Their Influence on Contract Behavior
Consistent with H2A, Table 5 clearly shows that the majority of channel
members with IRAP> 0 engage in spot contracting relationships on
both the selling and the buying side (87%) if a natural hedge is present.
Using a one-sample multinomial test (Bain and Engelhardt 1987), the
correctly-classified hypothesized contract relationships were found to
be significant.15 Consistent with H2B, the majority (78%) of the channel
members with IRAP< 0 choose asymmetric contracting relationships
in a natural hedge situation. Again, the correctly-classified channel
contract relationships were found to be significant. The results confirm
the general hypothesis (H1) that the interaction between IRAP profile
and market structure drives channel contract relationships on both the
buying and selling side.
Consistent with H3A, if no natural hedge is present in the market
structure (lower part of Table 5), the majority of channel members (92%)
with IRAP< 0 choose fixed-price contract relationships on both the
buying and selling side. In contrast, the majority of channel members
(72%) with IRAP>0 chose spot contracting on both the buying and
15. There are c possible types of channel relationships, A1, A2, . . . , Ac . In our case c = 3
and A1 = spot contract relationships on both the selling and buying side; A2 = fixed-price
contract relationships on both the buying and selling side; A3 = Asymmetric contract rela-
tionships in a sample of size n (the sum of a column in Table 5). Let o1, . . . , oc denote the
number of observed outcomes of each channel member. We assume probabilities P(Aj) = pj,
j = 1, . . . c, where
Pc
j¼1 pj ¼ 1, and we wish to test the completely specified hypothesis H0:
pj = pjo, j = 1, . . . c. Under H0 the expected values for each type are given by ej = npjo. The
chi-square statistic can then be written as: x2 ¼Pcj¼1ðoj  ejÞ2=ej. The limiting distribution
of this statistic is chi-squared with c = 1 degrees of freedom, so an approximate size a test
is to reject H0 if x
2> x21a (c  1).
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TABLE 5 Classification of Channel Members’ Channel Contract Relationships by IRAP, Market Structure and Channel Power
Market Structure IRAP> 0 (n = 103) IRAP < 0 (n = 105)
r> 0 (Natural hedge exists)
Incidence of Channel
Contract Relationships:
All channel
members
Low-power
members
High-power
members
All channel
members
Low-power
members
High-power
members
Spot contracting on both buying
and selling side 27* 12* 15* 5 5 0
Fixed-price contract relationships on
both the buying and selling side 2 2 0 12 12 0
Asymmetric contract relationships 2 1 1 62* 43* 19*
Correctly classified channel members 87% 86% 94% 78% 72% 100%
r 0 (No natural hedge exists)
Incidence of Channel
Contract Relationships:
All Channel
members
Low-power
members
High-power
members
All channel
members
Low-power
members
High-power
members
Spot contracting on both buying
and selling side 3 2 1 18* 12* 6*
Fixed-price contract relationships on
both the buying and selling side 66* 12* 54* 3 3 0
Asymmetric contract relationships 3 2 1 5 0 0
Correctly classified channel members 92% 75% 96% 72% 86% 100%
* Indicates that the percentage of correctly classified channel members, based on the observed contract relationship, is significant at p < 0.05, employing a one-sample
multinomial test (e.g. Bain and Engelhardt 1987).
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selling side (H3B). Here too, the correctly-classified channel contract
relationships were found to be significant.16 Interestingly, channel mem-
bers with a negative IRAP profile show risk-increasing channel contract
behavior. A comment from one of the channel members who operates in a
market structure without natural hedges and who uses spot contracting
relationships on both the buying and selling side illustrates their moti-
vation: ‘‘In our business, input prices and output prices do not have a
positive relationship, in fact they often move in opposite directions. We
use spot contract relationships on both sides, so that we may take ad-
vantage if the gap between input and output prices widens’’.
E. Does Channel Power Strengthen the Influence of IRAP?
Recall that H4 claims that channel power strengthens the influence
of IRAP. To test this, we distributed the channel members’ contract
relationships along the dimensions of low and high channel power, as
shown in Table 5. Table 5 shows that if IRAP> 0 and a natural hedge
situation exists, the percentage of correctly-classified channel contract
relationships increases from 87% to 94% (compare column 2 with
column 4 in upper right part of Table 5). Similar results are found for
the other cases: IRAP < 0 and natural hedge situation (78% vs.
100%), IRAP> 0 and no natural hedge situation (92% vs. 96%), and
IRAP< 0 and no natural hedge situation (72% vs. 100%). This con-
firms H4. These empirical results suggest that channel members use
channel power to shift risk when IRAP> 0, or they use channel
power to accumulate risk when IRAP< 0.
VII. Discussion and Conclusions
Marketing has a long tradition of studying the (optimal) structure of
marketing channel relationships. Concepts such as trust and channel
power play an important role in this context. In contrast, finance
has focused on raising and allocating financial funds. The financial
performance of a firm, often expressed in terms of its capacity to
generate shareholder value, has often been the dependent variable in
finance research. As a result, concepts such as cash flow volatility and
risk play an important role in financial literature. In this paper, we begin
to integrate the principles of marketing and finance in the context of
contract relationship management between suppliers and buyers. The
results show that the marketing and finance approach can be tied to the
channel member’s IRAP profile and market structure on the buying
and selling side.
16. The number of observations in the cells corresponding to a market structure with no
natural hedge and negative IRAP is lower than for the market structure characterized by a
natural hedge situation, thereby weakening the Chi-square test.
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Although previously neglected in the channel literature, IRAP is an
important variable in trying to understand channel behavior, particu-
larly in turbulent markets. When market researchers suspect the do-
main to entail some level of risk, it is recommended that they take
IRAP into account when analyzing channel behavior. The impact of
IRAP appears to become even more important when there is power
asymmetry in the channel.
When channel members perceive risk, they use their power to either
shift it away from them, when they are risk averse, or to accumulate it,
when they are risk seeking. They do so through various channel con-
tract strategies. Based on the cash flow consequences of channel
contracts, we make a distinction between three types of channel con-
tract strategies: 1) establishing spot contract relationships on both the
buying and selling side, 2) establishing fixed-price contract relation-
ships on both the buying and selling side, 3) establishing asymmetric
contract relationships.
Our empirical study reveals that risk attitudes and risk perceptions
differ across channel members, and that this results in different types
of risk management behavior for upstream and downstream channel
members. Channel contracting behavior is driven by the interaction
between IRAP and the channel member’s market structure on the
buying and selling side.
Channel members have a wide range of risk reduction instruments
and risk reduction strategies available. Knowing and recognizing the
IRAP profile of other members within the channel seems valuable, since
IRAP, in combination with the marketing channel member’s market
structure, reflects a channel member’s contract preference structure.
Conducting business with other channel members depends heavily on
the way one expects the other channel member to behave. To gain in-
sight into the behavioral pattern of channel members, it is necessary to
understand the IRAP profile and the market structure of other channel
members. In the empirical study, the IRAP profiles and the channel
market structures of producers differ from that of wholesalers and
processors. This results in substantially different channel contracting
behavior between them.
In this study, risk perception was measured with a self-report scale,
thereby lacking the advantages of the revealed-preference methods
which were used to elicit risk attitude. Using a revealed-preference
method for risk perception, such that the respondent’s cumulative
probability distribution function were elicited (e.g., Farquhar 1984;
Jia, Dyer, and Butler 1999), would further enhance our measurements
of IRAP and would reinforce our conclusion that IRAP is a critical
variable in understanding channel behavior. An elicitation technique
measuring the respondent’s cumulative probability which can be
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conveniently applied in a channel setting is the interval technique.17
This technique can be used for encoding the channel member’s sub-
jective probability function, and is, as such, closely related to Pratt and
Arrow’s conceptualization of risk perception. Having elicited some
points of the cumulative probability function for the channel member,
one might fit a distribution function (e.g., lognormal or Weibull) to the
points and use the parameters or the moments of the distribution for
further analysis. Combining these results of the interval technique with
the certainty equivalence technique will result in a strong predictor
(i.e., IRAP) of channel contract behavior.
An important strain of channel research literature uses the trans-
action cost model. Usually, a channel member has the opportunity to
sell or buy his or her goods through different marketing channels, such
as traders, wholesalers, retailers, or even to sell directly to the final
customer. This choice of distribution channel, therefore, determines
the extent of price risk exposure. When selling or buying, we expect
channel members to choose marketing channels that fit their IRAP
profiles. Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) found the transaction cost
model to have low predictive power in classifying export firms in
terms of their channel choices. This suggests that such a model might
be incomplete (cf. Heide and John 1988). Given this flaw in the
transaction cost model, IRAP could be a valuable complement that
may increase its predictive accuracy. Moreover, this integration of
IRAP into the transaction cost model is supported by the literature on
market entry, which suggests that factors related to political and
economic risks influence channel integration and channel choice
(Keegan 1984).18
Appendix A
The Role of the Interaction between Risk Attitude and Risk Perception in
Risk Management
In Pratt and Arrow’s work, risk management, reflected in the risk premium p,
is a function of risk attitude (risk aversion r), the situation (base wealth W ) and
17. See Smidts (1990) for a detailed discussion and application of the interval technique.
18. Financial support from Euronext, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Foundation for
Research in Agricultural Derivatives, Iowa Pork Association, the Marketing Science Institute,
Unilever, AST (Algemene Stichting Termijnmarkten), the Niels Stensen Foundation, and the
Office for Futures and Options Research made it possible to conduct the large-scale inter-
view. The authors appreciate the insightful comments of two anonymous referees, Pradeep K.
Chintagunta (editor), Abbie Griffin, James Hess, Erno Kuiper, Matthew Meulenberg, Rudy
Nayga,WilliamQualls, Jose Antoine Rosa, Ale Smidts, andMichaelWard on prior drafts of this
paper. The authors also express their thanks to the participants of the 1999 Marketing Science
conference in Syracuse, the 7th Behavioral Decision Research in Management Conference
(2000), and the participants of the marketing seminar at the London Business School.
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perceived risk (with a mean of e¯ and variance s2 of source of additional wealth q).
In their analysis, risk management is determined by the statement that the risk
premium leaves the decision-maker indifferent between holding the perceived risky
asset or holding its mean value minus the risk premium. That is, EUðW þ eÞ ¼
EUðW þ e pÞ, where EU is the expected utility. In the expected utility model this
translates into:
EUðW þ eÞ ¼
Z
UðW þ eÞ f ðeÞde ¼ UðW þ
Z
e f ðeÞde pÞ; ðA1Þ
where U (.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and f (.) the
probability density function of additional wealth q. By taking Taylor series ap-
proximation around W, the behavioral equation is approximately equivalent to
EUðW þ eÞ ¼ UðW Þ þ U 0 ðW Þ
Z
e f ðeÞdeþ 1
2
U
0 0 ðwÞ
Z
e2f ðeÞde
¼ UðW Þ þ U 0 ðW Þ
Z
e f ðeÞde p
 
: ðA2Þ
For simplicity, assume that e¯ ¼ 0, then, solving for the behavioral risk premium,
we obtain
p ¼ 1
2
Z
e2f ðeÞdeU
0 0 ðW Þ
U
0 ðW Þ ðA3Þ
which can be written as:
p ¼ 1
2
s2rðW Þ; ðA4Þ
where rðW Þ ¼ U 00ðW Þ=U 0ðW Þ, the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. From (1)–(4), it follows that risk management behavior depends on
the interaction of perceived risk and risk aversion. The right hand side of ex-
pression (4) for the behavioral risk premium equals IRAP, that is IRAP 
s2rðW Þ.19
Appendix B
Description of Risk Perception Scale
Confirmatory factor analysis was used (using LISREL 8) to examine the mea-
surement quality (Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom 1993). In this study, channel members
19. We thank James Hess for his discussion.
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were asked to indicate their agreement with the following items through a nine-
point scale ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly agree’’:
1) I am able to predict hog prices
2) The hog market is not risky at all
3) I am exposed to a large amount of risk when I am buying/selling hogs
Construct Reliability: 0.82
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